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Among the many motives for economic integration that have been put forward, stands 
the fact that an economic union benefits from the diversity of its member countries. The 
rationale behind that argument is that if one region of an economic union undergoes a slump 
while another experiences a boom, transfers from the latter to the former may help smooth 
their incomes. Income smoothing, or risk sharing, may thus be a sizeable benefit of economic 
integration. 
Assessing the practical implications of that argument is particularly important in the 
case of the European Union. Namely, it is of great interest to know whether the loss of 
monetary independence may be at least partly compensated by greater income smoothing in 
the EMU. To answer that question, two sub-questions must be answered. 
Firstly, one must determine the channels through which transfers among states may 
take place. Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) show that in the US 62% of shocks to gross 
state product are smoothed by capital and credit markets, and 13% by the federal budget. 
Using the same method, Sørensen and Yosha  (1998) find that only 40% of shocks are 
  2smoothed in Europe and the OECD. With a slightly different approach, Mélitz and 
Zumer (1999) conclude that 75 to 80% of idiosyncratic shocks go unsmoothed in the EU. 
These authors however also stress that monetary union may well increase smoothing through 
market channels, by fostering the integration of capital markets. This prediction is in line with 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001)’s finding that there is little risk sharing between countries but that 
a substantial degree of interregional risk sharing exists within federations. That literature 
therefore not only underlines that a sizeable proportion of consumption smoothing does not 
depend on public transfers, but also that risk sharing is positively influenced by economic 
integration. 
Secondly, to the extent that some consumption smoothing may occur, its importance 
will depend on the characteristics of the countries that take part in the union, and in particular 
on the variances and covariances of their growth rates. One may then wonder which set of 
countries may provide the highest degree of risk sharing. With that end in view, Goldberg and 
Levi (2000) use the portfolio theory as a natural tool to answer that question in a recent and 
groundbreaking study. 
The basic idea of their method is based on the analogy between countries and financial 
assets. Each country is accordingly described by the mean and the standard deviation of the 
growth rate of its GDP, which are the analogues to the expected return and risk of a financial 
asset. Their approach allows them to study the potential for risk sharing in the EU or 
alternative subsets of countries, analyzed as country portfolios. They observe in particular that 
few portfolio benefits have been realized by expansion of the EU beyond its original six 
members. In this paper, we probe more deeply into those results and the method from which 
they stem. However, our method differs from Goldberg and Levi (2000)’s in two important 
respects. 
The first difference is that we do not consider countries as basic assets described by 
their own risk and return. Instead, we consider each country as a collection of industries. The 
analogy on which our study rests is therefore between industries and financial assets, where 
the growth rate of an industry and the standard deviation of its growth rate are the analogues 
to expected return and risk in financial portfolios. The same analogy was fruitfully used by 
Gunther and Robinson (1999) to study the industry diversification effect of interstate mergers 
among US banking groups. This modification of Goldberg and Levi (2000)’s method allows 
to study the evolution of the portfolio attributes of European countries as their sectoral 
composition evolves over time. By contrast, Goldberg and Levi  (2000) could only study 
alternative groupings of countries but not the evolution of their portfolio attributes, because 
  3these attributes were defined as means over the 1979-1994 period and were consequently 
time-invariant by construction. 
The issue of the evolution of the portfolio attributes of countries comes nevertheless to 
the fore once one remembers that the very process of economic integration is likely to 
significantly alter the sectoral composition of the countries that take part in the process, hence 
their portfolio attributes. Thus, as European integration fosters trade integration, it is bound to 
affect the specialization of participating countries. The effect of trade integration is however 
ambiguous. If Krugman  (1993) for instance argues that monetary integration may foster 
specialization, hence the resurgence of idiosyncratic shocks, empirical studies, such as 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) or Frankel and Rose (1998), reach the opposite conclusion. 
The impact of European integration may also run through a subtler but less ambiguous 
channel that hinges on the relationship between risk and specialization. From a theoretical 
perspective, that relationship has attracted a lot of attention and spurred an extensive body of 
literature. Accordingly, risk is considered as an impediment to specialization according to 
comparative advantage, since the works of Brainard and Cooper  (1968), Kemp and 
Liviatan (1973) or Ruffin (1974). That result may nevertheless not hold if trade in financial 
assets, i.e. the possibility to share risk, is made possible. This latter finding was first suggested 
in a seminal contribution by Helpman and Razin (1978), and extended by Anderson (1981). 
Subsequent contributions, such as Grossman and Razin  (1984, 1985) or Helpman  (1988), 
added credibility to that result by considering more realistic sources of uncertainty, such as 
country-specific shocks. The rationale of that result is that insurance through trade in financial 
assets may compensate the increased risk stemming from specialization. Its chief implication 
is that better risk sharing should result in greater specialization, which is precisely what 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) observe in a recent and groundbreaking empirical study. 
Moreover, increased risk sharing may also affect an economy’s growth, in other words 
its return according to Goldberg and Levi (2000)’s analogy. Several channels have thus been 
described in the literature to account for this impact of risk sharing. Accordingly, risk sharing 
may increase the return on capital, thereby resulting in higher investment and faster growth as 
in Greenwood and Jovanovic  (1990). However, as Obstfeld  (1994) or Acemoglu and 
Zilibotti  (1997) suggest, it may also affect investment qualitatively by giving agents the 
possibility to opt for riskier, but more profitable, investments or technologies. Finally, growth 
may also be affected through the positive effect of risk sharing on specialization, either 
because it allows a better exploitation of comparative advantage, as in Saint-Paul (1992), or 
because of the possibility of learning by doing, which is studied by Feeney (1999). 
  4Our modification of Goldberg and Levi (2000)’s method stands therefore as a natural 
extension of that literature. Provided that European integration is bound to have affected the 
specialization of European countries, we assess how it may affect their capacity to share 
macroeconomic risk, either at the country or the Union level. 
The second chief difference between our analysis and Goldberg and Levi (2000)’s is 
that, whereas they resort to graphical comparisons, we measure risk-return performance by 
the ratio of the portfolio return divided by its risk. We can then quantify the evolution of the 
risk-return performance of European countries and of the EU as a whole. It also allows us to 
study the risk-return performance of alternative groupings of the members of the EU. 
To do so, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the evolution 
of the industry mix of European countries and of the European Union as a whole. Section 3 
studies the evolution of the risk-return performance of individual member countries and the 
EU as a whole. Section 4 describes the portfolio attributes of alternative subsets of countries. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Diversification in the European Union 
 
We found a comprehensive description of the industry mix of the EU and its member 
countries over the 1986-97 period in the 1997 and 2000 issues of the Eurostat Statistical 
Yearbook. The nominal GDP of each country and of the EU as a whole are split between 6 
industries.
1 In this section we measure the evolution of the diversification of European 
economies thanks to the Herfindahl index that we compute on the shares of each industry in 
each country. The Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the squared relative shares of 
industries in each country. It takes into account the relative size and distribution of the relative 
shares in a country, and it is lower the more diversified is the country. To obtain a more 
precise picture of the diversification of European economies, we complement the Herfindahl 
index with the share of the first industry in each country. 
 
                                                           
1 Those industries are: agriculture, forestry and fishing; energy; manufacturing; construction; marketable 
services; non-marketable services. 
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Table 1: The evolution of diversification 
 
  Herfindahl  Share of the first industry  
Country  1986 1997 1986 1997 
Austria 29.26  34.27  44.8  52.3 
Belgium 33.67  37.91  51  56.5 
Denmark 29.53  31.38  45.3  47.1 
Finland 25.40  28.51  38.1  41.4 
France 30.47  34.28  47.1  51.9 
Germany 30.69  36.66  43.3  53.9 
Greece 23.92  36.78  38.3  56.9 
Ireland 26.18  30.18  37.2  41.0 
Italy 31.02  34.48 47.7  52.8 
Lux 39.49  47.26  57  65.9 
NL 32.66  31.74  51.7 48.8 
Portugal 27.67  29.86  41.6  45.7 
Spain 29.79 32.99  46.8  51.8 
Sweden 27.16  30.24  38.3  43.3 
UK 29.48  36.11 45.2 54.5 
EU15 29.89 34.54  45.6  52.4 
All figures are in percentage. 
Lux: Luxembourg, NL: Netherlands, UK: United Kingdom, EU15: European Union (15 member countries). 
 
Table 1 displays the results for the fifteen member countries for the years 1986 and 
1997. It shows that the Herfindahl indices in general increased over the period of study. This 
first impression is confirmed by the evolution of the share of the first industry, which also 
rose between 1986 and 1997. For instance, Greece experienced the sharpest variation in 
diversification with an increase of 12.84 points of its Herfindahl index and of 18.6 points of 
the share of its first industry. As in all other countries, that industry was the marketable 
services sector both in 1986 and 1997. The evolution of the Herfindahl indices may then be 
explained by the growth of the share of this industry. 
The Netherlands stands as the exception since it is the only country that grew more 
diversified, as both measures of diversification prove. More precisely, their Herfindahl index 
  6declined from 32.66% to 31.74%, whereas the share of their first industry decreased from 
51.7% to 48.8%. As regards international comparisons of Herfindahl indices, Greece was the 
most diversified economy in 1986, with a Herfindahl index of 23.92%, whereas Finland was 
in 1997, with a Herfindahl index of 28.51%. On the other hand, Luxembourg was the least 
diversified country both in 1986 (39.49%) and 1997 (47.26%). Our findings corroborate the 
results of previous studies. For instance, Midelfart-Knarvik et al.  (2000) observe that the 
production of all EU countries but the Netherlands became more specialized between the 
periods 1980-83 and 1994-97.
2
The evolution observed on individual member countries can similarly be observed at 
the European Union’s level. Table 1 shows that the European Herfindahl index increased over 
our period of study and rose from 29.89% in 1986 to 34.54% in 1997. As a result, it appears 
that the European Union grew less diversified between 1986 and 1997, which is confirmed by 
the rise in the share of the marketable services industry over the same period. 
The greater specialization depicted by table 1 may be a matter of concern insofar as it 
may result in a greater asymmetry of macroeconomic shocks, which would be costly in a 
monetary union.
3 This concern may be alleviated by two considerations. Firstly, the observed 
concentration results from the specialization of European economies in the same industry, 
namely the marketable services sector. Secondly, greater asymmetry as such may not be as 
harmful as it first seems, provided some risk sharing exists. More to the point, the risk sharing 
literature surveyed in the introduction implies that more risk taking is required to achieve 
more risk sharing. 
Nevertheless, one may be tempted to deduct from table 1 that individual countries or 
the European Union may perform more poorly in risk-return terms as their diversification 
decreased, resulting in less risk sharing. This is not necessarily true and two possible 
evolutions may in particular contradict that simple intuition. European countries may thus 
have reallocated their activities towards more efficient industries, i.e. industries with a higher 
return and a lower risk. Alternatively, by concentrating their activities, European countries 
may have efficiently traded-off a higher return against a higher risk. In both situations, a 
                                                           
2 For a survey of the literature devoted to the specialization of European economies, see Dierx et al. (2002). 
3 An anonymous referee suggested that this prediction could be tested by comparing the corelation of GDP’s on 
two subperiods. Although this is feasible, it may also be misleading over our period of study. Indeed, the 1986-
1997 period that we consider is marked by both an evolution of the structure of European economies and a 
convergence of national economic policies, implied by the general process of monetary integration. It would 
therefore be quite difficult to disentangle the relative impact of those two influences on the correlation of 
European countries’ GDPs. However, such an exercise would make perfect sense over another period or within a 
country, at the regional level. 
  7greater concentration of activities is consistent with a constant or increased risk-return 
performance. 
To give a better account of the evolution of European countries and the European 
Union in risk-return terms, one has to describe more precisely their portfolio attributes, which 
is the aim of the next section. 
 
3. An assessment of the risk-return performance of the industry mix 
in Europe 
 
As our line of reasoning rests on the application of the portfolio method, we must 
firstly describe how we adapted that method to study the risk-return performance of the 
industry mix of a country. We subsequently apply that method to the case of individual 
countries and to the European Union as a whole. 
3.1. Methodology 
 
To apply the portfolio method one must describe the assets of which the portfolios 
under study consist and determine the weight of each asset in those portfolios. Accordingly, 
and following Gunther and Robinson  (1999), we consider countries as a collection of 
industries. They can therefore be analyzed as portfolios whose basic assets are industries.  
For the purpose of our analysis, we measure each industry’s return by calculating the 
growth rate of each component of GDP at the European level. We subsequently interpret the 
average annual growth rate of an industry’s production as the analogue to the expected return 
of a financial asset, whereas the variability of the annual growth rate of its production is the 
equivalent of the risk associated with a financial asset. 
More precisely, we used the Eurostat decomposition of nominal GDP to compute each 
industry’s annual nominal production at the EU level and used the EU-wide consumer price 
index provided by Eurostat to calculate each industry’s real production. We subsequently 
worked out each industry’s growth rate and finally obtained the mean and the standard 
deviation of the growth rates of the six industries over our period of study. The results of our 




  8Table 2: Industries’ return and risk 
Variable  agri energy  manu cons marc nmar 
Return  −2.143  0.971 0.878 1.267 3.713 2.297 
Risk  4.312 2.986 2.294 3.143 0.611 1.529 
All figures are in percentage. 
agri: agriculture, forestry and fishing; energy: oil, gas, coal extraction, nuclear power, hydroelectricity; manu: 
manufacturing; cons: construction; marc: marketable services; nmar: non-marketable services. 
 
The choice to employ the EU-wide consumer price index instead of the GDP deflator 
to compute real industry GDPs is motivated by a convincing argument put forward by 
Sørensen and Yosha  (2002). These authors argue that using the GDP deflator to deflate 
nominal GDP in empirical measurement of risk sharing is inadequate because it neutralizes 
the variations of a region’s income due to the variations of the price of its production. Using 
an area-wide (here an EU-wide) consumer price index precisely allows not to neutralize that 
part of the evolution of income. 
Besides, the way we assess each industry’s risk and return assumes the existence of 
single industries across Europe. Although this assumption may seem extreme at first sight, it 
makes sense in the context of our analysis. Thus, assuming the existence of industries at the 
European level allows us to neutralize the impact of national economic policies that European 
governments will not be able to use in the future. Therefore, our results rely on sectoral 
shocks that will not be affected by the loss of independence of economic policies implied by 
European integration. Moreover, and above all, there is recent evidence obtained by Ramos et 
al. (2003) that the importance of sectoral shocks is increasing relative to national shocks and 
now exceeds national shocks’. By assuming the existence of single European industries, we 
consequently focus on the shocks that have become prevalent. 
As regards the weights of each asset in the portfolio, we suppose that the weight of an 
industry in a country’s portfolio is simply the contribution of that industry to that country’s 
GDP. Consequently, the share αi,j,t of industry i ( i = 1,…,6) in country j’s portfolio 
(j = 1,…,15) during year t (t = 1986,…,1997), which can be read in the Eurostat Statistical 
Yearbook, is simply given by: 
t , j
t , j , i GDP
production s ' i industry
= α         ( 1 )  
Once each industry’s risk and return and its share in a country’s GDP have been 
defined, the overall return of a country’s portfolio is readily obtained by weighting each 
industry’s growth rate by the relative importance of that industry in the portfolio of the 






i t , j , i t , j g G α          ( 2 )  
where gi is industry i’s average annual growth rate. 
Similarly, the standard deviation of the return of a country’s portfolio that is labeled 








k , i t , j , k t , j , i t , j std ω α α         ( 3 )  
In the above expression, ωi, k denotes the covariance of industry i’s growth rate with 
industry k’s. However, whenever i = k, ωi, k simply denotes the variance of industry i’s growth 
rate. 
With these definitions in mind, the application of the portfolio method is 
straightforward. The final step of our analysis is to assess the risk-return performance of a 
country’s industry portfolio. Therefore, following Gunther and Robinson (1999), we measure 
a country’s risk-return performance by the ratio of its portfolio’s average growth rate (its 
return) divided by the standard deviation of its portfolio (its risk). This is simply given by: 
t , j
t , j
t , j std
G
e Performanc =          ( 4 )  
 
In the following sub-section, we use our method to study the evolution of the risk-
return performance of the EU and its member countries. 
 
 
3.2. The evolution of the risk-return performance of European countries’ 
industry portfolios 
 
As we emphasized before, the simple observation that countries have grown less 
diversified between 1986 and 1997 does not allow us to conclude that their industry mixes are 
inefficient. They may thus simply have either reallocated their activities towards more 
efficient industries or traded off a higher return against a higher risk. In the absence of a 
collective utility function that would allow us to rank countries in welfare terms we must 
resort to our measure of performance to assess the relevance of European countries’ industry 
mixes. Table 3 displays the result of our computations. 
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 Return  Risk  Performance 
Country  1986 1997 1986 1997 1986 1997 
Austria  2.31 2.55 0.99 0.92 2.34 2.77 
Belgium  2.49 2.66 0.91 0.84 2.74 3.16 
Denmark  2.33 2.46 1.00 0.94 2.33 2.62 
Finland  2.03 2.24 1.15 1.07 1.76 2.09 
France  2.37 2.56 0.94 0.87 2.52 2.94 
Germany  2.28 2.59 1.05 0.89 2.17 2.89 
Greece  1.72 2.45 1.28 0.95 1.35 2.56 
Ireland  1.94 2.12 1.20 1.16 1.61 1.82 
Italy  2.31 2.51 0.99 0.87 2.34 2.89 
Lux  2.61 2.93 0.94 0.80 2.77 3.69 
NL  2.41 2.48 0.84 0.89 2.87 2.78 
Portugal  2.05 2.31 1.10 0.99 1.87 2.32 
Spain  2.24 2.47 1.00 0.90 2.24 2.74 
Sweden  2.26 2.44 1.01 0.95 2.23 2.58 
UK  2.36 2.58 0.90 0.85 2.62 3.05 
EU15  2.31 2.54 0.98 0.88 2.37 2.88 
Return and risk are in percentage. 
Lux: Luxembourg, NL: Netherlands, UK: United Kingdom, EU15: European Union (15 member countries). 
 
Casual observation of table 3 suggests that the risk-return performance of European 
countries in general tended to improve. Thus, the performance of fourteen member countries 
out of fifteen increased. That first impression is confirmed by the evolution of the return and 
risk associated with these countries. Namely, it appears that return systematically increased 
whereas risk decreased for those countries between 1986 and 1997. In other words, the 1997 
industry mixes of these European countries strictly dominates their 1986 industry mixes in 
first-order stochastic terms – meaning a higher return and a lower risk.
4
As before, the only exception is the Netherlands, whose performance decreased over 
the period of study from 2.87 to 2.78. However, this country’s evolution is not as 
straightforward as the evolution of the other EU countries. Specifically, the Netherlands has 
experienced a surge in its return but that surge is more than compensated by an increase in 
their risk, which accounts for the evolution of their performance. 
The rationale behind those results must be found in the evolution of the industry mixes 
of European countries. It may be driven by two trends, which are respectively the shrinking of 
                                                           
4 A noteworthy implication of this result is that it implies a welfare gain for each country’s representative 
consumer, regardless of her risk aversion. Our findings therefore do not rest on the definition of our measure of 
performance. This will also hold true for the ranking of country groupings in the next section. 
  11the agricultural sector and the expansion of the marketable services industry. In risk-return 
terms, these sectors are respectively the least and the most efficient one, as shown in table 2. 
Consequently both trends concur to the improvement of the risk-return performance of EU 
countries. The special case of the Netherlands can also be accounted for by the same intuition, 
as it is the only country where the share of the marketable services industry decreased along 
the period. 
Finally, an international comparison of performance scores reveals cross-country 
differences. In 1997, performance ranged from a low 1.82 for Ireland to a high 3.69 for 
Luxembourg. This ranking may result from the fact that these countries have respectively the 
smallest and the largest marketable services industry among European countries, which is as 
above-mentioned the most efficient industry in risk-return terms. 
 
3.3. The evolution of the risk-return performance of Europe as a whole 
 
As the Eurostat Statistical Yearbook not only provides the share of each industry in 
European countries’ GDPs but also in the European Union’s GDP, the application of the 
portfolio method to the EU is straightforward. 
The same trend can be observed for the Union as a whole as for most of its member 
countries taken separately, in table 2. Thus, the EU’s performance increased from 2.37 to 2.88 
between 1986 and 1997. More precisely, its return rose from 2.31% to 2.54% whereas its risk 
decreased from 0.98% to 0.88%. There again, the 1997 version of the EU strictly dominates 
its 1986 version in stochastic terms. 
Graph 1 sketches a richer picture of the evolution of the EU in risk-return terms. Each 
year’s risk is measured on the horizontal axis and each year’s return is measured on the 
vertical axis. It reveals that the Union’s return generally steadily increased while its risk 
decreased from one year to another over the whole period, resulting in a year to year 
improvement of risk-return performance. The only exception is the 1987-1989 period, during 
which risk and return increased. Nevertheless, performance still improved between 1987 and 
1988. It only deteriorated between 1988 and 1989. 
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To explain those results, both at the country and Union levels, one must bear in mind 
that there is no simple relation between concentration and performance. However they are 
probably due to two auspicious evolutions. On the one hand, the share of the marketable 
services industry, which provides the highest return for the lowest risk, as table 2 shows, 
increased in almost all countries as well as in Europe as a whole. On the other hand, the share 
of the industry exhibiting the lowest return and the highest risk, namely the agriculture 
forestry and fishing industry, persistently decreased. By the same token, the special case of 
the Netherlands can be accounted for by the decrease in the share of the marketable services 
industry in that country, which both enhanced its diversification and lowered its performance. 
The finding that the potential for risk sharing increased with specialization may seem 
at odds with the findings of Kim (1995) and Asdrubali et al. (1996). Namely, Kim (1995) 
reports that specialization has decreased over time in the United States at the state level while 
Asdrubali et al.  (1996) find that risk sharing among US states has increased over time. 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) confirm those two trends. 
The contradiction of those results with ours is only apparent. Indeed, our paper does 
not exactly measure the same phenomenon as Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Kalemli-Ozcan et 
al.  (2003). Namely, whereas they are concerned with observed risk sharing, we measure 
potential risk-sharing. Therefore, our results are not directly comparable. What accounts for 
  13their results is both the evolution of the specialization of US states and the evolution of the 
channels through which risk sharing occurs. The present paper only deals with the former. 
 
4. Comparing the performance of alternative EU configurations 
 
The composition of an economic union may always be subject to alterations. For 
instance, the composition of the EU evolved in several instances in the past, with the 
admission of new member countries. One may therefore wonder whether those successive 
enlargements were associated with improvements in risk-return performance. Moreover, and 
as monetary integration is about to foster risk sharing, one may also wonder whether the 
current Euro Zone may benefit from the inclusion of new member countries. 
In this section, we consider the situation of the current European Union with the 
situations of alternative arrangements among subsets of its member countries. We must 
therefore complement our method so as to describe the portfolio attributes of imaginary 
unions. The next sub-section describes how we perform that analysis and the following two 




To apply the portfolio method to an imaginary economic union, we consider that union 
as a portfolio of countries that are themselves portfolios of industries. We must therefore 
define each country’s weight in the union’s portfolio. Following Goldberg and Levi (2000), 
we assume that the weight of each country is given by the relative GDP of that country versus 
that of the group. 
To avoid the distortions that may be caused by the volatility of exchange rates, we 
base our calculations on GDPs expressed in US dollar converted thanks to an exchange rate 
computed at purchasing power parity values. Those data stem from the Growth Development 
Network database of the World Bank. Once each country’s weight has been computed, the 
weight of an industry in the union’s portfolio is simply given by the sum of the shares of that 
industry in the member countries of the imaginary union weighted by the weights of the 












t , j , i t , i
GDP
GDP
α β         ( 5 )  
Where n is the number of countries in the imaginary union. 
Once these shares are defined, the imaginary union’s portfolio attributes are readily 
obtained following the same method as in the previous section. We can therefore compute its 
performance score and compare it with that of the current EU or those of other imaginary 
unions. 
As Goldberg and Levi (2000) appropriately underline, a limitation of that application 
of portfolio analysis is that it is based on past data. Thus, the risk-return characteristics of the 
industries we study are considered constant whereas they might have been different, had the 
composition of the union been different. In other words, we consider that an industry’s 
average growth rate and the covariances between industries’ growth rates are constant. We 
acknowledge that limitation of our method which is unfortunately inevitable.
5 We must 
however stress that, unlike Goldberg and Levi (2000)’s method, ours allows us to take into 
account the modifications in the countries’ structures over time, which partly addresses that 
criticism. 
Moreover, our method permits another improvement of Goldberg and Levi (2000)’s 
method. As their analysis is based on average size over their period of study, it cannot take 
into account the fact that faster growing countries tend to become relatively more important in 
the portfolio over time. By contrast, our method allows us to compute a different weight every 
year and cannot raise the same criticism. With these considerations in mind, the next sub-
section presents the outcome of our calculations. 
 
4.2. The consequences of EU enlargement in portfolio terms 
 
In this sub-section, we concentrate on the last year of our period of study and compare 
the portfolio attributes of the current EU with those of the previous EU groupings that would 
have occurred if they had been left unchanged. We therefore compare the imaginary 1997 
                                                           
5 A possibility would have been to compute variances and covariances over sub-periods, as is common in the 
empirical finance literature, but the time series at our disposal are too short to allow us to perform such an 
exercise. 
  15portfolio attributes of the EU6, of the EU9, of the EU12 and of the Euro Zone (Greece 
included) with those of the current EU15.
6 Table 4 displays the results. 
 
Table 4: The 1997 portfolio attributes of previous EU groupings 
 
 Return  Risk  Performance 
EU6  2.556 0.877 2.915 
EU9  2.553 0.874 2.920 
EU12  2.539 0.880 2.887 
Euro Zone (12)  2.528 0.890 2.841 
EU15  2.538 0.881 2.880 
Return and risk are in percentage. 
 
That table allows us to draw a few conclusions regarding the impact in terms of risk-
return performance of the successive enlargements of the EU. Thus it appears that if the EU9 
had lasted until 1997, it would have exhibited a better performance than all the other historical 
groupings. The first move from six to nine members would therefore have led to an optimal 
situation in 1997, which contrasts with Goldberg and Levi (2000)’s finding. Nonetheless, the 
EU9 does not strictly dominate the EU6 in stochastic terms. Thus, although the EU9 provides 
a lower risk than the EU6, its return is also lower. 
However the EU6 and the EU9 both dominate the other groupings, in stochastic terms. 
In particular, a move from the EU9 to the EU12 in 1997 would have had adverse 
consequences in terms of risk and return: the performance measure would have fallen from 
2.920 to 2.887. Besides, the impact of the last enlargement from the EU12 to the EU15 would 
have been more limited (from 2.887 to 2.880). 
What explains the drop in performance between the EU9 and the EU12 is the industry 
composition of the EU members. In 1997, the share of the agriculture industry was more 
important in Greece, Portugal and Spain than in the EU9. On the other hand, the industry 
mixes of Austria, Finland and Sweden were closer to the EU12’s, which accounts for the 
limited effect of the last enlargement. 
                                                           
6 The EU6 includes Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The EU9 consists of the 
EU6 plus Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. The EU12 consists of the EU9 plus Greece, Portugal and 
Spain. The EU15 consists of the EU12 plus Austria, Finland and Sweden. The euro zone includes Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
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observed between the historical groupings are quite limited and may not be significant. More 
precisely, the range between the best and the worst country grouping, in terms of either risk, 
return, or performance, is an order of magnitude smaller than the variations observed in 
individual countries’ performances over the period of study. If we for instance focus on our 
measure of performance, we find that the difference between the best and the worst country 
groupings (i.e. the EU9 and the Euro Zone) is equal to 0.079, whereas the average variation of 
a country’s performance between 1986 and 1997 amounts to 0.48. 
Consequently, our results lend themselves to two opposite interpretations. Thus, 
whereas a euro-phile could use them as an argument in favor of past enlargements, a euro-
skeptic could argue that not much has been gained or lost with these enlargements in terms of 
risk sharing. 
 
4.3. Who’s next? 
 
In this sub-section, we assess the consequences of the inclusion of new countries in the 
Euro Zone. More precisely, we study three fictitious Euro Zones, each consisting of the 
current Euro Zone plus another EU country which does not yet take part in the current 
monetary union. We therefore compare the portfolio attributes of the Euro Zone plus 
Denmark, of the Euro Zone plus Sweden, of the Euro Zone plus the United Kingdom, and of 
the current Euro Zone. The results are displayed in table 5. 
 
Table 5: The 1997 portfolio attributes of alternative Euro Zones 
 
 Return  Risk  Performance 
Euro Zone (12)  2.528 0.890 2.841 
Euro Zone + Denmark  2.527 0.891 2.836 
Euro Zone + Sweden  2.526 0.891 2.834 
Euro Zone + UK  2.537 0.882 2.875 
Return and risk are in percentage. 
 
It appears that the inclusion of Denmark or Sweden would slightly reduce the risk-
return performance of the Euro Zone. Indeed a Euro Zone including Denmark or Sweden 
  17would face a weak decrease of its performance from 2.841 to 2.836 and 2.834, respectively. 
More to the point, table 5 reveals that the current Euro Zone would dominate the new 
alternative zones in stochastic terms. The similarity of the consequences of both inclusions 
may hinge on the closeness of the industry mixes of Denmark and Sweden. On the contrary, 
the taking part of the United Kingdom in the Euro Zone would improve the zone’s stochastic 
attributes. Namely, the performance would then rise from 2.841 to 2.875. 
Next to the sign of the variations in performance that would result from the inclusion 
of an additional country, the differences in the magnitude of the variations may raise 
attention. What accounts for these differences is chiefly the entrant’s size, besides its industry 
mix. Indeed the UK is the only economy that is large enough to significantly affect the 
industry composition of the zone. 
As before, these results must be considered with caution. The changes induced by the 
entry of a new country in the Euro Zone result in limited evolutions, compared to the 
observed variations in the performance of individual countries between 1986 and 1997. 
Therefore those results may also lend themselves to contradictory interpretations. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we apply the portfolio theory to judge whether the evolution of their 
sectoral composition has resulted in portfolio benefits for the members of the European Union 
during the 1986-1997 period. In this aim, we compute a measure of risk-return performance 
for EU countries, based on growth rates and growth rate volatilities of industries, by 
considering countries as collections of industries. We find several important results. 
Firstly, while diversification slightly declined over the period, risk-return performance 
improved in all countries but the Netherlands. Our findings suggest that European countries 
concentrated their activities on more efficient industries. 
Secondly, the evolution of the European Union as a whole is similar to the evolution 
of individual countries. If we except the 1988-89 period, its performance constantly improved 
over time. 
Thirdly, when comparing the portfolio attributes of the current European Union with 
those of the previous EU groupings (EU6, EU9, EU12) and the Euro Zone, we observe that if 
the EU9 had lasted until 1997, it would have dominated all the other historical groupings. It is 
also of interest to notice that the EU15 is more efficient than the Euro Zone, which may plead 
in favor of an enlargement of the Euro Zone. 
  18Fourthly, we also investigate the consequences of the enlargement of the Euro Zone to 
either Denmark, Sweden or the United Kingdom, i.e. the three EU members that do not 
participate in monetary union. We find that, while Denmark and Sweden would marginally 
reduce the risk-return performance of the zone, the taking part of the United Kingdom in the 
Euro Zone would slightly benefit the zone. It has however to be stressed that the differences 
between the various country groupings are fairly limited. 
Besides, our paper lends itself to several extensions in space and time that all depend 
on the availability of fresh data. An obvious prolongation will be to resume the analysis on a 
regular basis to keep up with the consequences of the future evolution of the European 
Union’s industry mix. Another application would be to investigate the consequences of EU 
enlargement beyond its present members, Eastern European countries being the most evident 
candidates. 
It must finally be underlined that our study focuses on the possibilities of risk sharing 
among European countries, as opposed to the effective extent of risk sharing. Whether those 
possibilities will be exploited in the future crucially depends on the magnitude of transfers 
among states and therefore on the evolution of the European institutional framework. The 
definitive answer to the questions we addressed in this paper consequently rests on politics 
rather than empirics. 
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